The human sciences that deal with natural things are necessarily speculative, therefore, while those that deal with things made by man are practical or operative according to the imitation of nature. From this it is clear that human reason can only know the things that exist according to nature, whereas it both knows and makes the things that exist according to art. Art, on the other hand, can examine the works of nature and use them to perfect its own work.
But nature, of course, does not achieve works of art it only prepares certain principles and in some way supplies artists with a model according to which they may operate. Ex quo patet quod ratio humana eorum quae sunt secundum naturam est cognoscitiva tantum: eorum vero quae sunt secundum artem, est et cognoscitiva et factiva: unde oportet quod scientiae humanae, quae sunt de rebus naturalibus, sint speculativae quae vero sunt de rebus ab homine factis, sint practicae, sive operativae secundum imitationem naturae.Ģ And that is why the Philosopher says that if art were to make the works of nature, it would operate in the same way as nature and, conversely, if nature were to make the works of art, it would make them the same way art does.
Ars vero inspicere quidem potest ea quae sunt naturae, et eis uti ad opus proprium perficiendum perficere vero ea non potest. Sed natura quidem non perficit ea quae sunt artis, sed solum quaedam principia praeparat, et exemplar operandi quodam modo artificibus praebet. And so in the things that it makes, the human intellect, which derives the light of intelligence from the divine intellect, must be informed by the examination of the things that come about through nature so that it may operate in the same way.Įt inde est quod philosophus dicit, quod si ars faceret ea quae sunt naturae, similiter operaretur sicut et natura: et e converso, si natura faceret ea quae sunt artis, similiter faceret sicut et ars facit. For if an instructor of some art were to produce a work of art, the disciple who receives his art from him would have to observe that work so that he himself might act in like manner. Hence the operations of art must imitate the operations of nature and the things that exist through art must imitate the things that are in nature. Now the principle of those things that come about through art is the human intellect, and the human intellect derives according to a certain resemblance from the divine intellect, which is the principle of natural things. The reason for this is that operations and effects stand proportionately in the same relation to one another as their principles among themselves. Et ideo intellectus humanus ad quem intelligibile lumen ab intellectu divino derivatur, necesse habet in his quae facit informari ex inspectione eorum quae sunt naturaliter facta, ut similiter operetur.ġ As the Philosopher teaches in Book II of the Physics, art imitates nature. Si enim aliquis instructor alicuius artis opus artis efficeret oporteret discipulum, qui ab eo artem suscepisset, ad opus illius attendere, ut ad eius similitudinem et ipse operaretur. Unde necesse est, quod et operationes artis imitentur operationes naturae et ea quae sunt secundum artem, imitentur ea quae sunt in natura. Principium autem eorum quae secundum artem fiunt est intellectus humanus, qui secundum similitudinem quamdam derivatur ab intellectu divino, qui est principium rerum naturalium.
Cuius ratio est, quia sicut se habent principia adinvicem, ita proportionabiliter se habent operationes et effectus. PROEMIUM PROEMIUM Sicut philosophus docet in secundo physicorum, ars imitatur naturam. The Leonine differs in text and arrangement, and corrections were made accordingly. This translation is based on the Spiazzi 1951 edition. Commentary on Aristotle's Politics Book 1: Lesson 1, and Book 3: Lessons 1-6
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